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Zaire is located in the midst of Africa which puts it directly
on the equator. As a result, tropical climate is predominant over most
of the country. The Zaire River, which is one of the longest in Africa,
runs clear through the country.
Historical Development of the Copper Mine
The origin of Zaire's mining industry goes back to the late 1800s
in Shaba. The presence of copper ores in Shaba was reported by the
Belgian explorers in the 1890s. As a result of their reports, the
Compagnie du Katanga, a holding company of the Belgian Financial Group
Societe Generale de Beligue was chartered in 1890 and empowered to
explore a huge land in the Congo including about one-third of Katanga.
However, no significant exploitation of the mineral was undertaken
throughout the 1890s,^ until 1901.
Presently, mining activities such as copper, cobalt, and a variety
of copper-linked metals which were originally produced by a single
Belgian firm, the Union Minere du Haunt-Katanga are now dominated by
the state-owned enterprise Gecamines. Other minor enterprises are
Sodimiza, a Japanese-owned company and SMTP (Societe Minere de Tenke-
Funkurume), an international consortium with a seventeen percent U. S.
^Zaire, A Country Study, Foreign Area Studies, edited by Irving
Kaplan (Washington, D. C.: The American University, 1979), p. 125.
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interest. In 1978, Gecamines produced ninety-three percent of Zaire's
copper and all its cobalt. Mining activities are largely concentrated
in the southeastern and eastern parts of the country, while petroleum
production is found in the far west in Bas Zaire region. Copper, cobalt,
zinc, and manganese, including gold, silver, cadium are located in
Shaba. Tin and coal deposits are also found in Shaba. Major diamond
deposits are found in the two Kasai regions, Kivu; tin, tungsten, gold,
and rare earths; and the northern part of Haunt-Zaire is the main source
of gold.^
In the mid-1970s, Zaire was the world's largest producer of cobalt
4
and industrial diamond and ranked seventh in mine production of copper.
Mineral products, principally copper, make up the bulk of exports and
account for the main source of foreign currency earnings.
Problem Statement
Little attention has been devoted to the economic role of the mining
industry in Zaire and specifically its impact on development. Most
previous studies on the impact of extractive industry on development
5
have focused primarily on cross-sectional analysis which tended to
?U. S. Overseas Business Report, Market Profile for Africa, June
1981, p. 43.
^Zaire, A Country Study, Foreign Area Studies, edited by Irving
Kaplan (Washington, D. C.: The American University, 1979), p. 125.
^Ibid., pp. 214-215.
^Paul Bairoch, The Economic Development of the Third World since
1900, translated by Lady C. Postan (Berkeley: University of California,
1977) and Michael Michaely, "Exports and Growth: An Empirical Investiga¬
tion," Journal of Development Economics Vol. 4 (1977):77-83.
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obscure the real impact of this sector on the economic development of
an individual country. This thesis is therefore a detachment from
the conventional cross-sectional studies to a single country study, as
such the need for a study such as this is great. Additionally, scholars,
policymakers, and other social scientists have expressed points of view
which strongly support the above contention, with respect to the mining
industry in Zaire. Ochola (1975) has argued that the actions of
foreign companies which are geared toward the promotion of traditional
export sector have negatively affected the mining industry in the develop¬
ing nations and Zaire in particular in achieving its major economic role
since almost all mining outputs are destined to foreign advanced
capitalist countries: France, Belgium, West Germany, Britain, and the
United States of America.
Beginning in the late 1960s, the government officials in Zaire were
filled with optimism that the expansion of the mining industry, especially
the copper mine, would generate sufficient foreign exchange for national
economic development. A surplus in foreign exchange earnings determine
the amount of imports, e.g., machinery and equipment, raw materials, and
other intermediate goods needed for industrialization. Economic
development via industrialization helps to improve the economic conditions
of the people, generate a high standard of living, savings for future
needs, and investment. As a result, efforts were made to expand the
mining industry in Zaire since the prices of cobalt, copper and diamond
were at that time very attractive in the world market.
-4-
The concern of this thesis is as follows: Has the mining industry,
particularly copper, cobalt, and diamonds, generated enough foreign
exchange earnings necessary to stimulate Zaire's economic development?
If yes, to what extent? If no, why? What is the extent of its impact
on national economic development?
An attempt is made in this work to try to analyze the extent to
which the mining industry has played a leading role on Zaire's economic
development. An attempt is also made to investigate the causes and
problems confronting the development of the mining industry in Zaire.
Research Objectives
The overall objective of this study is to identify and analyze the
role of the mining industry in Zaire as it affects agriculture, income
generation, employment, and foreign exchange earnings.
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
The argument that exports stimulate the economic development of
the developing countries through their generation of incomes and
investments, foreign exchange, employment, and the development of
infrastructure (transport and power) has been followed by numerous cross-
sectional and case studies. These studies have generally attempted to
explain how the above argument comports to the development of the less
developed economies. The following is a review of the work of some
scholars who have attempted to study the implications of primary export-
led development in developing economies.
Ochola (1975) has argued that the exploitation of the mineral
resources in Zaire has failed to establish forward and backward
linkages that often accompany the opening of mines. His data was
analyzed by estimating the percentage share of mining contribution to
gross domestic product (GDP), employment, and foreign exchange earnings.
His results showed that employment in the mining sector has been
declining in percentage terms relative to other sectors, although in
numerical terms it has been increasing.^ In 1966, mining accounted
for 10.9 percent of wage earners employed by enterprise, 10.3 percent
in 1967, and 9.4 percent in 1968. On the other hand, mining contribution
to total government revenue and foreign exchange earnings saw a dramatic
^Samuel A. Ochola, Minerals in African Underdevelopment (London:
London Vi Her Press, 1975), p. 130.
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increase in the same period. From 1966 to 1968, mining contributed
over fifty percent of total government revenue and about eighty-five
percent of its foreign exchange earnings. However, its contribution
to GDP showed a decline of two percent during this period. The finding
that mining's contributions to GDP and employment were lower than its
contributions to government revenue and foreign exchange earnings led
Ochola to conclude that the mining sector has promoted economic growth
2
rather than economic development. He attributed the cause to the
influence of foreign interests in Zaire's mining industry and the
consequent export of all mining outputs to the advanced capitalist
countries. He supported his argument by listing the names of multi¬
national and international agencies that dominate the mining operations
in Zaire.
Mikesell (1974), on the other hand, attempted to study how the
copper industry in Zaire has affected its employment, income, and
government revenue. His data was also analyzed by estimating the
percentage share of copper contribution to employment, income, and total
government revenue. His results showed that copper production was not
clearly linked to other sectors of the economy. Employment generation
has been small in proportion to output, while government receipt has
increased overwhelmingly. For instance, between 1968 and 1979, total
employment in the copper industry fell from Z23,800 to Z23,530, while
^Ibid., p. 135.
O
Raymond Mikesell, "The Impact of Copper Industry in Zaire," Scott
R. Pearson and John Cownie, ed., Commodity Exports and African Economic
Development, 1974, p. 254.
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government receipts from Gecamine increased from Z159.5 million in
1968 to Z295.6 million in 1970. However, the income of salaried
employees increased during the same period from Z214.4 million to Z218.7
million due to the increase in wage rates. Furthermore, after all
expenditures were substracted from Gecamine's total receipts for 1968
and 1970, the balances which represented direct domestic impact of
copper mining were relatively small: Z210 million in 1968 and Z211.5
million in 1970. Mikesell, therefore, concluded that "the major economic
impact of the copper industry arises from the payment to the government,
and degrees of its impact depends upon the way the government distributes
4
the revenue."
The impact of the mining sector (oil) on Iraq's economic development
has been presented by Kadhim (1979). The data on sectoral contribution
to GDP (in percent at current prices) and the structure of employment
were presented and analyzed. The results showed that oil sector accounted
for more than one-third of the country's GDP during 1953 to 1973.
Following the rise in oil prices, the share of the oil sector in Iraq's
GDP rose sharply, amounting to fifty-three percent in 1974, fifty-seven
percent in 1975, and sixty percent in 1976. The author also found that
while the share of oil in total output was rising that of the agriculture
was declining.
Furthermore, the diminishing role of agriculture and the growing
dominance of oil were not accompanied by similar changes in the pattern
of employment. For example, agricultural employment as a percentage of
^Ibid., p. 256.
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Iraq‘s total employment increased from about forty-nine percent in
1963 to fifty-six percent in 1973. During the same period, the oil
industry's share of total employment declined moderately. Kadhim, there¬
fore, argued that "the oil industry, in other words, failed to play the
role of leading sector." The reasons for this failure he argued are:
1) the oil industry is capital-intensive and, therefore, cannot absorb
a substantial percentage of the labor force; 2) the foreign oil companies
confined their operations to extraction and export and as such refrained
from investing in downstream operations such as refining; and 3) the
inability of the government to establish petrochemical and other oil-
based industries.
Kadhim's conclusion was that "the link between the oil industry and
C
the rest of Iraq's economy is very weak." The fact that oil sector
employs less than two-thirds of one percent of the labor force meant
that its direct contribution to income and aggregate demand is minor.
In a cross-section analysis of forty-one countries, Michaely (1977)
has shown that economic growth and export are positively and strongly
correlated only among the more advanced countries and nonexistent at
all among the least developed countries. These countries were divided
into two sections. The first section comprised countries with 1972
per capita income of above $300 and the second group of countries with
$300 per capital income or less. In the first group, coefficient of
5
Al-Eyd A. Kadhim, Oil Revenues and Accelerated Growth: Absorptive
Capacity in Iraq (New York! Praeger Company, 1979), p. 29.
®Ibid., p. 35.
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rank correlation between economic growth and the volume of export was
0.523 (significant at the one percent level), whereas in the second
group, it was practically zero (-0.04).^ This seems to show how export
performance influences growth once countries achieved some minimum level
of development. Thus, the assertion that export growth and economic
growth are strongly correlated among the more developed countries seems
valid. In order to test an alternative version of the relationship
between economic growth and export growth, that is, the higher the export
ratio in a country, the more rapid the country's economic growth,
Michaely tried to correlate the average export ratio of each country
to its economic growth. The correlation coefficient for the two
8
variables was -0,326 (significant at the 2.5 percentage level). This
suggests that the proposition: the higher the export ratio, the higher
a country's economic growth, does not seem to hold.
Finally, he attempted to test the impact of export proportions
on economic growth by including each country's relevant attributes
(size, nearness to large foreign markets). By partially correlating
the mean annual change of per capita gross national product (GNP) with
the "export levels" for 1965, he found no change in the correlation
q
coefficient (0.01). This indicates that export proportions as such
have no apparent influence on the rate of economic growth.
^Michael Michaely, "Exports and Growth: An Empirical Investigation,"




A radical analysis of^the implication of export-led development
has been presented by the dependency theorists. Dependency theory is
derived from the theory of European imperialism to the Post World War II
situation in order to explain extensively external penetration and
lagging economic development of many formally sovereign third world
nations. In essence, theories about imperialism and dependency emphasize
the asymmetrical or unequal relations between the developed countries
and the developing countries. These asymmetrical linkages, it is argued,
"created a condition in which events and decisions in the dependent
country are significantly constrained by external forces.Thus, a
dependent society is one "where economic productive activity and the
structure of social relations are largely reflections of process elsewhere
in the world."^^
External dependence is thought by "dependencia" theorists to
produce a variety of internal dependency results. In particular, dependency
is believed to cause serious distortions and retardations in domestic
economic and social development and many of the economic problems in
the third world, e.g., deficit in the balance of payment, trade deficit,
etc. are seen as emanating from imperial domination. "In the economic
realm, dependent states are discouraged from industrialization and
generally follow a path of 'vertical trade,' exchanging raw materials
for manufactured goods. Foreign investment, in addition, create 'export
^^Cal C. Clark and Donna B. Bahry, "Dependent Development: A Socialist




enclaves,' segmenting economic activity within the dependent economy.
Production is primarily tied to external—not internal--demand, which
vitiates economic 'multiplier effects' and provides structural incentives
12
for depressing wages."
These economic effects are also transmitted into the social realm.
While industrialization may provide many positive spin-offs in terms of
promoting the education and skills of a population, these benefits are
denied to LDCs on the receiving end of a pattern of verticle trade. The
elites of the dependent nations also tend to form alliances with the
superordinate state and corporations, supporting the interests of these
exploiting forces against those of their less fortunate countrymen.
These indigenous elites then use the external support that they receive
to consolidate their own positions and to exploit the bulk of their own
populations, thus serving their own "class interests" and bringing
13
greater inequality and the need for repressive political institutions.
The following is a review of some of the literature on dependency theory.
Dos Santos (1970) has attempted to analyze the major forms of
dependence that exist between the strong and weak countries. Santos
defined dependence as "a situation in which the economy of certain
countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another
economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of interdependence
between two or more economies and between these and world trade, assumes




and can be self-sustaining, while other countries (the dependent ones)
can do this only as positive or negative effect on their immediate
14
development." He then went on by listing what he considered as the
three major forms of dependence between the center and the periphery:
1) colonial dependence; 2) financial industrial dependence; and 3) a new
type of dependence based on the operations of the multinational corporations.
According to Santos, in forms (1) and (2) of dependence, production
is concentrated on those products which are meant for exports (gold,
silver, diamond, and tropical products) in the colonial period; raw
materials and agricultural products in the epoch of industrial financial
dependence, that is, the level of production is maintained in response
to the demand from the hegemonic centers. The internal productive
structure is characterized by rigid specialization and monoculture in
the entire region. He argued that industrial development is dependent
on the availability of capital and raw materials needed in the industrial
sector; that the LDCs are dependent on the DCS for these industrial
needs meant the "preservation of the traditional export sector, which
limits economically the development of the internal markets by the
conservation of backward relations of production. It also signifies
politically the maintenance of power by traditional decadent oligarchies.
In the countries where these sectors are controlled by foreign capital,
it signifies the remittance abroad of high profits and political
^^Theotonio Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence," American
Economic Review, May 1970, p. 231.
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dependence on those interests. He argued further that industrial
development is then strongly conditioned by fluctuations in the balance
of payments. This leads toward deficit due to the relations of dependence
themselves. For instance, trade relations take place in a highly monopo¬
lized international market which tends to lower the prices of raw
materials and to raise the prices of industrial products, particularly
inputs. Furthermore, there is a tendency in modern technology to replace
various materials and to raise the prices of industrial products,
particularly inputs. Modern technology also has a tendency to replace
various primary products with synthetic raw materials. Santos finally
argued that industrial development is strongly conditioned by the
technological monopoly exercised by the imperialist centers. This makes
the underdeveloped countries highly dependent on the center for the
importation of machinery and raw materials needed for the development
of their economies. He concluded "that this structure of dependence
limits the citizen's ability in making independent decisions on resource
allocations, pricing, marketing, and processing of their primary
products."^®
Amin (1974) has tried to demonstrate in his book Accumulation on a
World Scale, (Vol. J) the unequal exchange between the developing nations
and the advanced capitalist countries. He found that the exchanges




than the exchanges between them and the developing nations. He showed
that while the advanced countries do about eighty percent of their trade
among themselves, only twenty percent is done with the underdeveloped
countries. On the other hand, the underdeveloped countries do eighty
percent of their trade with the advanced countries. He supported his
findings by constructing a list of tables on direction of export, 1960
to 1965 world distribution of trade; and the structure of annual average
export for 1960 to 1965. The tables show that the share of the advanced
capitalist countries accounted for seventy-five percent of the world
trade, while that of the underdeveloped countries accounted for nineteen
percent. The tables on structure of exports show that manufactured
goods composed the trade of the advanced countries.
Finally, he argued that "the structure of trade of the advanced
countries and the tendency of trade between them to increase more rapidly
cannot be explained without referring to the inherent tendency of
capitalism to expand markets. The specialization of the underdeveloped
countries cannot be explained without referring to the theory of the
functions of the periphery in the world capitalist system, since in
fact, the exports of the underdeveloped world are made up not mainly of
agricultural products from the traditional agriculture of these
countries, but raw materials and agricultural products originating from
modern, high-productivity sectors-mines, plantations, oil v/ells—whose
17
productivity is comparable to that found in advanced countries. Amin,
^^Samir Amin, Acculumation on a World Scale: A Critique of the
Theory of Underdevelopment, Vol. 1 and 2 (New York: Monthly Press, 1974),
p. 69.
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further contended that external trade does not make up for the inequality
in.consumption of manufactured goods. This inequality has increased
with the increasing specialization of the world and its division into
industrialized and nonindustrialized countries. Industrialization,
according to him, does not bring wealth—the level of consumption of
manufactured goods depends on the level of local production of these
goods. The only apparent exception offered by rich countries that are
large importers of manufactured goods (the "White Dominions," Denmark,
etc.), Amin argued, is not really an exception because they not only have
a substantial industrial production of their own, but also obtain a
considerable supplement of manufactured goods. They also have rich and
specialized agriculture. He contended that the underdeveloped countries
cannot replace their nonexistent production of manufactured goods by
increasing their imports. In order to consume per capita, the equivalent
of the world average, they would have to multiply their imports by forty,
18
and therefore their exports by forty. Such a development is not
possible even if the agricultural and mineral countries could do this,
the industrial countries would not want such an excess of products.
For some underdeveloped countries, the volume of imports of manufactured
goods is approximately equal to that of the advanced countries. Here
too, however, consumption remains very low because of the absence of
local production of these goods which in the advance countries continues




"theory of comparative cost is too simple and too general to account for
19
reality in all complexity."
Bairoch (1979) has presented an extensive work which traced the
evolution of the unequal exchange between the capitalist center and the
periphery back to 1800. He applied a variety of methods to the problems
of estimating standards of living among nations and economic regions
before they began to industrialize and found that the gap between the
po
richest and poorest countries was in the order 1:1.5 to 1.6. In 1960
U. S. dollars, this translates into a range of $130 to $150 for the
poorest countries and $190 to $240 for the richest preindustrial societies.
When one compares larger economic regions such as Europe, India, and
China, the "gap" shrinks to a ratio of 1:1.2 to 1.3. By the late 1970s,
the gap had widened to 1:30. Moreover, fully sixty percent of the
world's current population live in the underdeveloped regions and twenty
percent in the developed, whereas before the industrial revolution and
21
imperialism, these percentages were around fifteen at each extreme.
This figure suggests the hypothesis that "since 1800, there has existed
an ever increasing gradient of exploitation within the capitalist world
system that has produced well-being at the core end of the relationship
22
and relative impoverishment at the periphery end."
^^Ibid., p. 69.
20
Paul Bairoch, The Evolution of the Gap between the West and the




J. M. Patrick and K. Bohdan, "Imperialism in World-System Perspec¬
tive," International Studies Quarterly 25 (1981):46.
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A number of cross-national empirical studies have been published
recently that contain evidence relevant to dependency analysis.
Tyler and Wogart (1973) worked with middle 1960s data in a cross-
sectional analysis of thirty-nine LDCs (fifteen Latin American and
Caribbean, eleven tropical Africa, six North Africa and Middle Eastern
and five Asian states plus Greece and South Africa). Their three
measures of economic dependency were the ratio of foreign trade to GNP,
the percentage of total exports going to the two major markets to total
exports. The consequence examined was income inequality and the authors
found via bivariate regression that dependency was negatively related
to the percentage share of national income received by the poorest twenty
percent and poorest sixty percent, and that dependency was positively
related to the percentage of income going to the richest five percent
of the population. These findings, according to the authors, are
consistent with dependency predictions. The signs of all nine regression
coefficients were as predicted and six out of nine were significant but
the low percentage of variance explained, .01 £ £ .20, suggests that
"factors other than economic dependence—as defined and measured—are
24
important in determining income distribution."
William G. Tyler and J. Peter Wogart, "Economic Dependence and
Marginalization: Some Empirical Evidence," Journal of Inter-American




Walleri (1975) has conducted a sophisticated statistical evaluation
25
of certain dependency predictions. Working with data from five time
points between 1960 and 1970 for eighty-four nations (fifteen developed
OECD states and sixty-nine LDCs—twenty-five tropical African, twenty
Latin American and Caribbean, fifteen Asian and nine North African and
Middle Eastern states, including Greece and Turkey). Walleri developed
indexes of dependency—trade partner concentration, trade commodity
pc
concentration, private investment concentration and Galtungs vertical
trade index that taps the international division of labor. Via factor
analysis and stepwise multiple regression he evaluated the ability of
these measures of dependency to account for static and dynamic measures
of economic growth and development as well as land inequality in 1968
for the subset of forty-one cases. Three intriguing patterns were
revealed by a factor analysis based on all eighty-four cases: a wealth
pattern probably caused by the presence of the fifteen OECD countries
where total GNP, total trade, GNP per capita, college students, and
energy consumption per capita clustered together; a size pattern where
total population was negatively related to the ratio of foreign trade
to GNP; and a dependency pattern in which three measures of dependency are
inversely related to eight static measures of development. The author
argued that this demonstrated that developed countries score low on
25
R. Dan Walleri, "Economic Imperialism as a Cause for Retarded
Economic Development in the Third World," a paper presented at the
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San
Francisco, California, September 1975.
^^Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," Journal of
Peach Research No. 2 (1971):101-102.
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dependency indicators and poor countries score high on the same dependency
measures. A second factor analysis of his nine measures of economic
change showed a clear pattern of economic growth for all eighty-four
countries, so Walleri used absolute and relative change in GNP per capita
as his dependent variable in a series of step-wise regression.27 He
found that average trade commodity concentration and average vertical
trade negatively and significantly affect absolute change in GNP per
capita (r2 = .51) and relative change in GNP per capita (r2 = .25).
Walleri inferred that this supports the hypothesis that the higher the
level of dependency the lower the rate of development change. If one
crudely controls for level of development by repeating the analysis just
for the sixty-nine LDCs, measures of dependency were found not related
to economic growth except investment concentration which only accounted
for twelve percent to nineteen percent of the variation in the two GNP
per capita change measures.28
Walleri's most important findings related to land inequality in
1968. For the forty-one cases for which data were available, the pattern
of correlation is consistent with a "vicious circle" causal chain in
which unequal land distribution in the form of Latifunda, estates, and
plantations leads to economic dependence on primary product exports which
result in retarded national economic development that probably reinforces
27r, Dan Walleri, "Economic Imperalism as a Cause for Retarded
Economic Development in the Third World," a paper presented at tl^ Annual
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco,
California, September 1975, Appendix III.
28lbid., p. 24.
-20-




Chase-Dunn (1975) and Rubinson (1976) have provided the most recent
cross-national evidence relevant to the dependency paradigm. Chase-Dunn
and Rubinson explicitly compared the predictions from neoclassical inter¬
national economic theories and theories of modernization developed by
conventional sociologists. One thousand nine hundred and fifty independent
variables were regressed on 1960 to 1970 measures of economic development
and inequality. Chase-Dunn worked with a sample of nations that had
GNP's per capita of less than $406 in 1955. Unfortunately, he did not
list the cases in an appendix and the regression analyses indicated that
the sample varied from forty-six to twenty-four, depending upon data
30
availability. He made no claim that this was a random sample.
His measures of economic dependency were: 1) investment dependency
per capita, the log of average 1950 to 1955 profits earned by foreign
investment in the host country whether they were repatriated or not; and
31
2) debt dependence—total external public debt in 1965. Economic
development was measured by the log of GNP per capita and 1950 and 1970,
the log of electricity consumed per capita, 1950 and 1965, and the
percentage of nonagricultural male labor force, 1950 and 1960. Income
^^Ibid., pp. 27-30.
on
Christopher Chase-Dunn, "The Effects of International Economic
Dependence on Development and Inequality: A Cross-national Study,"





inequality was Paukert's 1965 Gini Index for fifty-six countries."
Chase-Dunn found that economic development was negatively and significantly
related to investment dependency in addition to the very strong positive
effect of previous levels of development. Moreover, this negative effect
by investment dependency did not wash out when domestic capital formation
was introduced as a control and it was increased when an index of speciali¬
zation on mining industry was introduced in the equation. Debt dependency
was not related to 6NP per capita but was negatively and significantly
related to electricity consumption per capita. Finally, both investment
dependency and debt dependency were positively but not significantly
related to income inequality for sub-samples of thirty-one and thirty
countries respectively. Chase-Dunn, therefore, concluded that "the
findings...indicated that dependency theory must be taken seriously as
33
an explanation of uneven development in the world economy.
At this juncture it is necessary to review some scholarly works which
have attempted to show that export-led development has been very important
in the economic development of the less developed countries, and which
have also lent no support to the dependency argument.
Lim (1968) has attempted to examine the degree to which the
experience of Ceylon conforms with, or is explained by the theories
concerning the effect of foreign trade on the development of economies
^^Felix Paukert, "Income Distribution at Different Levels of Develop¬
ment," International Labor Review 108 (1973);97-125.
33
Chase-Dunn, "The Effects of International Economic Dependence on
Development and Inequality: A Cross-national Study," American Socio¬
logical Review Vol. 40 (December 1975):735.
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exporting primary goods. The available evidence on Ceylon was examined
in view of the following assumption: 1) deteriorating terms of trade
against countries exporting primary goods; 2) lagging foreign demand
for primary goods; and 3) the "Enclave" of a foreign-owned export sector.
He found that deteriorating terms of trade argument seems irrelevant
in explaining Ceylon's failure to develop because available data show a
downward long-term trend in the conmodity terms of trade since the 1900.
The commodity terms of trade of all commodities traded were presented,
i.e., the data were not classified for exported agricultural produce
vis-a-vis imported manufactured commodities. The author argued that such
classification would not be very meaningful in the case of Ceylon, since
she imports large amounts of rice, wheat, fish, curries, potatoes, onions,
and other "unmanufactured goods." The proportion of "wholly manufactured
goods" rarely exceeded forty percent of total annual imports. Further,
a large proportion of these wholly manufactured goods consisted of
35
machinery, fertilizer, and fuel for the export industries. Lim concluded
that the experience of Ceylon did not seem to support the argument that
36
foreign trade deters the terms of trade of the developing countries.
In rebuttal to Nurkse's assertion that "the expansion of external
demand for the primary commodity exports of the poorer countries appears
in recent years...to have lagged behind the rate of increase in both the
OA
Youngil Lim, "Trade and Growth: The Case of Ceylon," Economic




exports and national incomes of the industrial countries." Lim argued
that beginning with coffee in the nineteenth century, the value of
Ceylon's exports increased steadily with the exception of the 1930s.
A very extensive table presented on page 248 showed that the growth of export
trade during the twenieth century had been more rapid than during the
nineteenth century. The rate of growth in value of total exports has
averaged six percent (compound rate) for the sixty-year period since 1900.
He argued that this was greater than the growth rate of population in
Ceylon for the same period. He also argued that Ceylon's exports have
increased on per capita basis. Throughout the nineteenth century, the
value of exports per capita rarely exceeded two pounds sterling, while
38it has grown to almost fourteen pounds sterling by the 1960s. He
contended that this fact was of interest in view of Nurkse's statement
that:
"...we can interpret the poorer countries export lag in its
most significant sense as lag in the rate of growth of external
demand in relation to the rate of growth of domestic factor
supplier."39
In Lim's view, the easily identifiable factor supply would be the growth
of population in an underdeveloped economy. He contended that the above
evidence indicates that Ceylon's exports have grown far more rapidly
37
R. Nurkse, Patterns of Trade and Development (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1961).
OO
Youngil Lim, "Trade and Growth: The Case of Ceylon," Economic
Development and Cultural Change Vol. 16 (October 1967/July 1968):247.
39
R. Nurkse, Patterns of Trade and Development (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1961).
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than her population, which means that Ceylon's exports have not lagged
behind.^^
Lim rejected the following contentions: 1) that export industries
have createdi within an underdeveloped country, an "economic enclave"
which is organized with imported labor and capital; 2) that the multiplier
effect occurs in the metropolitan country from which the foreign factors
have come and to which the factor income returned. He argued that available
data on Ceylon indicated, however, that the export sector grew to augment
market demand for domestic output rather than to form an economic enclave.
Further, the structural changes in the domestic sector's economy have
been the result of her growing export sector. According to him, the
export multiplier was estimated not at zero, but at 2.5 for the 1948 to
1954 data in constant prices; which means that for every rupee's worth
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of exports, about 2.5 rupee's of domestic income was created, a figure
he indicated was confirmed by K. Tharmaratan (1956) and W. Rasaputran
(1964).
Nicholas A. Lash (1970) has demonstrated that a developing economy
can register favorable terms of trade by expanding and concentrating on
the production of its primary export products until that country is able
to acquire the technological and technical-know-how needed for manufac-
turning industrialization. He uses Thailand as a country case study.
^^Youngil Lim, "Trade and Growth: The Case of Ceylon," Economic




He attempted to show that Thailand enjoyed favorable terms of trade from
1956 to 1966 by relying on its primary exports. In addition, the
Thai-Japanese terms of trade was computed to help measure Thailand's
performance against advanced countries. He used three different indexes
to examine the relevance of the Prebisch-Singer's hypothesis (the terms
of trade are steadily worsening for the countries producing primary goods
vis-a-vis the countries producing industrial goods) as it applies to
Thailand.
The indexes are the commodity terms of trade (the ratio of export
prices, Px, to import prices. Pm); the Dorrance index which measures the
total value of exports divided by import prices (prices of exports, Px,
multiplied by quantity of exports, Qx, the product being divided by import
prices. Pm); the Stachle index which measures the total value of imports
divided by export prices (import prices. Pm, times quantity of imports,
N 42
Qm, the product being divided by export prices, Px).
All three indexes showed an improvement in the terms for Thailand.
The commodity terms of trade show an improvement from ninety-seven to
116 between 1956 and 1966. The Dorrace index rose from 107 to 236.
The Stachle index showed the most substantial improvement (from ninety-
43
four to 283) over this eleven year span.
Lash argued that the improvement of Thailand's terms of trade
reflected the price and value increases in its major exports. Rice, which
accounted for approximately one-third of the total value of exports in
^^Nicholas A. Lash, "Primary Product Export and Growth: The Case of




1965, enjoyed an increase in value of approximately nineteen percent
between the years 1957 and 1966. According to Lash, this improvement
was helped in part by the fact that several Asian countries were unable
to reach their rice production targets in 1965. Rubber, which accounted
for approximately sixteen percent of export value in 1965, increased
approximately thirty-two percent in the same ten-year period, despite
competition from synthetic rubber. Thailand's third major export, tin,
had the largest increase in value (1.8 percent from 1957 to 1966), while
44
maize increased by 107 percent in the same period.
The results also showed that the Thai-Japanese trade has not
conformed to the Prebisch-Singer's thesis. For instance, the percentage
ratio of the price index of Thai export to Japan and imports from Japan
rose from eighty-eight in 1957 to 110 in 1966. In the same period,
Japan's export price index deteriorated from 106 to ninety-three. Much
of this decline was attributed to productivity improvements which had
helped reduce the prices of Japanese exports. "The author concluded
that this decline belied Prebisch's assumption that productivity gains
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in advanced nations will not lead to a reduction in prices."
Baldwin (1966) has studied the relationship between economic
development and export growth using North Rhodesia (Zambia) as a case
study. His objective was to examine the difference between the amount







those on mineral exports. Via multiple regression and historical
analysis, he found that in export economies, based on agricultural
exports, a large proportion of people benefited directly or indirectly
because of a high labor coefficient of agricultural exports. However,
in the case of Northern Rhodesia, economic development has been largely
based on the mining export of copper since 1930, which has a very low
labor coefficient. Moreover, a large number of workers needed technical
training, and in the early years it was considered more economical to use
European skilled workers than to train Africans. This, according to
Baldwin, created a dualist economy. At the later years African mine
employees were trained, and Baldwin argued, "that in general, mining
provided more training in a wide range of skills with applications in a
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great variety of industries than plantation agriculture." In his final
chapter, he argued that this has given Zambia the opportunity to build
up manufacturing industries geared to foreign markets, especially in
neighboring countries to the north and east. In other words, Baldwin
was contending that the mining sector has been responsible for the
generation of domestic skilled manpower.
Vengroff (1976) has written a series of articles that evaluate
empirically selected dependency theory propositions as they apply to
tropical Africa. In "Dependency Development and Inequality in Black
Africa," Vengroff demonstrated the existence of five types of African
external dependence: 1) trade partners concentration in exports;
E. Baldwin, Economic Development and Export Growth: A Study of




2) trade partner concentration in imports; 3) aid donor concentration;
4) export product specialization; and 5) military trade partner concen¬
tration. Second, although it meant reducing his cases to fourteen because
of data unavailability, Vengroff used the most recent Gini Index measures
AQ
of income inequality calculated by Jain for the World Bank (IBRD). In
the middle 1960s, income inequality varied from a high of .64 for Gabon,
to a low of .31 for Niger. Moreover, while his fourteen cases hardly
represented a random sample of tropical African states, Vengroff showed
that they are representative of all black African states, a variety of
key variables. Using GNP per capita as a control, he showed via regression
analysis that development is positively related to inequality and that
dependency is unrelated to inequality except for export product speciali¬
zation which showed a significant and negative relationship. Vengroff
concluded that in this direct test of a central dependency paradigm
proposition, that dependency promotes inequality, evidence clearly contra¬
dicts the proposition regarding tropical Africa in the 1960s.
The argument advanced by Ochola, Mikesell and Khadim that the mining
industry has failed to play a leading role of development, especially in
generating employment and in the improvement of the infrastructure, can
be challenged if one takes into consideration the policy motives underlying
the development of the mining industry in Zaire and perhaps in other
developing countries. Second, the role of the government cannot be
dispensed within analyzing the reasons why mining industry in Zaire is
not linked to other sectors.
48s. Jain, Size Distribution of Income (Washington, D. C.: The
World Bank, 1975TI
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It has been argued that the sharp expansion of the mining output
in recent years, which was followed by a decline in the number of workers
both skilled and unskilled, is said to be a reflection of the economic
objectives of Gecamines and Zairian government. The major objective of
the state owned company and Zairian government was to maximize net foreign
exchange revenues from operations and not necessarily to expand employment
opportunities. Ochola in particular, overlooked this fact and dealt
mainly on the impact of foreign interests which is only a part of the
problems contorting the mining development in Zaire. Although Mikesell
and Khadim did recognize the importance of government policy on develop¬
ment, they, however, failed to mention the effects of multinational
corporations on development. An analysis of the role of any primary
commodity in a developing economy should take many factors into
consideration rather than one or two factors.
Michaely's work seems to confirm one important point, that is,
economic growth is positively related to export growth only among the
developed countries. However, his inclusion in the study of semi-developed
countries like Korea, Israel, Greece and Spain as LDCs seems to have
overdue influence on his results. Data for his study was collected
from 1950 to 1970, and toward the end of 1970 it may be unjustifiable
to include these countries as LDCs. Secondly, he did not classify the
export of these countries according to their composition. Countries like
Korea and Spain were mainly exporters of manufactured products whereas
countries like Ghana and Nigeria were exporters of primary commodities.
The absence of this classification does not clearly differentiate the
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consequences of export-led developed based on manufactures from those
based on primary products.,.
The dependency theorists have attempted to demonstrate that the
economic underdevelopment of LDCs is a cause emanating from an unequal
trade exchange between the center and the former. However, their theory
contains some weaknesses. Among them are: 1) Dependency as a concept
is not properly defined. It is often equated with the capitalist
exploitation of LDCs. It does not analyze the relationship between the
Soviet Union and her communist bloc, Cuba, Nicaraqua and Bulgaria.
Secondly, the dependency paradigm does not recognize that unequal trade
exchange exists between one capitalist country and another. For instance,
the trade relation between the United States and Japan in the area of
auto industry is one marked with unequal exchange. The influx of Japanese
cars in the United States has affected the American auto industry both
in employment generation, revenue, and in deteriorating terms of trade.
2) Dependency has not been adequately operationalized. 3) Evidence
used to support dependency analysis is thus overstated, inconclusive, and
more often used to illustrate rather than to demonstrate. 4) Dependency
theory overlooks some trade relations between a particular advanced
country and a particular developing country. There are some cases where
developing countries have benefited from trade more than their foreign
partners (advanced countries). For instance, Thai's exports price index
to Japan rose from eighty-eight percent in 1957 to a high of 110 percent
in 1966. In the same period Japan's export price index deteriorated
from 106 to ninety-three.
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The cross-sectional studies reviewed seem to confirm the dependency
propositions. Perhaps the most important reason for their positive
findings is that the cross-nationalists work with large samples of states,
including semi-peripheral countries like Greece and South Africa and in
the cases of Walleri and Rubinson, center-developed OECD states. This,
of course, results in greater variation in measures of dependency and
its predicted consequences than when the study is limited to one dependent
region.
The review of the literature which showed the positive effect of
export on development failed to consider the most important indices of
development; employment generation, income and its distribution, consump¬
tion, and infrastructure, they rather dealt with terms of trade, income
per capita, and GNP growth which are but indices of economic growth.
The development of the export sector is not only to promote economic
growth, but through its growth economic development could be achieved.
Studies by Lim and Lash demonstrated the rapid economic growth made by
Thailand and Ceylon through the development of their export sector, but
had nothing to say about the rate or level of employment generated by
the export sector or the role it played in generating income and improving
the infrastructure. Studies on development should take these important
variables into consideration.
Baldwin's study on Northern Rhodesian (Zambia) experience with the
mining industry showed that this industry provided more training in a
wide range of skills with applications in a great variety of industries
than plantation agriculture. However, he failed to account sufficiently
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for the wage differentials between African mine workers and the expatriates.
The fact that Africans were trained (that is having the same skill and
education as the expatriates) did not narrow the gap between the wages
received by expatriates and the wages received by their African counter¬
parts. The International Labor Organization's (ILO) report to the
Government of Zambia on Income, Wages, and Prices in Zambia (1969),
showed that from 1964 to 1968 a total of 6,000 expatriates were paid an
annual salary of 7,600 kwacha while a total of 50,000 Africans received
an annual salary of 1,300 kwacha. This figure shows that expatriates
received approximately six times wages as much as their Zambian counterparts
in the mining sector; It can then be argued that the mining industry in
Zambia favored foreign interests six times more than it favored the
domestic interests.
The review of the above literature has shown that the development
of mining industry in Zaire is inconsistent with the assumptions of the
theory of international trade. There is sufficient evidence in this
review that the presence of foreign interests and the role of government
have affected the expected role of the mining industry as a leading
export sector. Also the arguments advanced by the dependency theorists
regarding the unequal and exploitative relationship between the center
and the periphery were tested and found positive in cross-sectional studies
and were found negative in regional studies. In fact, the success or
failure of export-led development depends on a conglomeration of factors:
foregin interests, government policies, demand and supply in the work




The data were drawn from the United Nations and other international
statistical publications^covering a period of thirteen years, from 1965
to 1977. Among which are:
1) Statistical Yearbook (various publications);
2) Statistical Yearbook—United Nations (various issues);
3) Bank of Zaire, annual report (various publications);
4) Monthly Bulletin of Statistics--!]. N. (various issues);
5) Historical Statistics of the U. S. (various publications);
6) International Bureau of Labor Statistics;
7) New African Yearbook, 1980;
8) International Financial Statistics Yearbook—IMF, 1982;
9) World Table, 1980;
10) Africa Research Bulletin (various publications)
11) Africa Report (various issues);
12) Africa News (various issues); and
13) Mineral Yearbook, 1983.
An attempt is made here to establish the relationship between the
mining industry in Zaire and the manufacturing industry, agricultural
sector, and the foreign exchange earnings. Development in each sector
was determined by its percentage contribution to Gross National Product,




Many authors like Bairoch and Ochola have used this approach in
measuring sectoral development. Another method of measurement is by
estimating the level or rate of employment and capital formation in
each sector, however, the unavailability of data makes this approach very
difficult. The share of GDP generated by each sector has the advantage
over the one based on employment in that it embodies the notion of
productivity. If it is assumed that the method of our estimation is
correct, the share of each sector in the GDP represents the relative
share of the sector in final production, for the later is roughly the
sum of employment and productivity. This implies that the use of the
share of GDP generated by each sector as a measure of sectoral development
also encompasses development in employment.
Zaire's foreign debt was used as an indication of the level of
foreign exchange available to her. This is justified because the ability
of a particular country to pay its foreign financial commitment depends
on the amount of foreign exchange it has.
Limitation of the Study
It is not possible in this paper to use regression analysis or the
input-output model in estimating the relationship between the mining
industry in Zaire and other sectors due to lack of data. For instance,
the data on employment generation in various sectors are scanty and
therefore are not very adequate in a time series via regression analysis.
Secondly, there are no available quantitative studies on the relation¬
ship between mining industry in Zaire and the rest of the economy. This
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is also due to lack of relevant data. A clear knowledge of the impact
of mining on Zaire's economy can be best understood whenever quantitative
studies are made available. This, however, does not mean that the results
contained in this paper are of no validity. What it means is that the
availability of quantitative studies will help to test the results or
findings presented in this study. This of course, will depend on the
efforts of Zaire's government in keeping appropriate data records.
Analysis
The export sector is very important in the economic development
plans of many developing countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America and
the Caribbean. The export of commodities, particuarly primary products
(food, food products, raw materials, minerals and fossil fuels) provides
the greatest proportion of foreign exchange needed by these countries for
the importation of skills, technology, and other important goods and
services which are not produced domestically, but are very essential to
provide a basis for stable and relatively high rates of economic develop¬
ment. From 1960 to 1976, receipts from commodity exports accounted for
more than seventy percent of the total balance of payment receipts of
all developing countries. Most of the arguments in favor of export
sector as an engine of economic growth have been concentrated on the
neoclassical theory of international trade which calls for less developed
countries to specialize in the production and the export of those
commodities in whose production (they) enjoy a comparative cost advantage.
^Jacob Viner, Studies in the Theory of International Trade (New York:
Harper Row Publishers, 1957), p. 348.
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The call that LDCs should specialize on the production and export
primary commodities does not- address the problem of export instability .
which often affects primary products from LDCs. There is evidence to
suggest that there are greater fluctuations in the prices of primary
products than in the prices of most industrial goods. The studies by the
United Nations Secretariat showed that the average-year-to-year fluctuations
in the prices of fifty primary commodities was fourteen percent per annum
in the first half of the twentieth century. These fluctuations appear
to be partly due to the relative price inelasticities of both the supply
and demand of primary goods and partly due to the relatively greater
influences of noneconomic factors such as the weather and other natural
3
phenomena in the LDCs. For instance, most statistical studies of world
demand patterns for different commodity groups tend to demonstrate that
in the case of primary products the "income elasticity of demand" is
relatively low, that is, the percentage increase in demand will rise by
less than the percentage increase in national income. On the other hand,
for fuels, certain raw materials and manufactured goods, the income
elasticity is relatively high. For example, it has been estimated that
a one percent increase in developed countries' income will normally raise
their import of foodstuffs from less developed countries by 0.6 percent,
agricultural raw materials such as rubber and vegetable oils by 0.5
O
Instability in Export Markets of Underdeveloped Countries (New York:
Uni ted Nations, 1952).
Geofrey N. Souter, "Export Instability and Concentration in the Less
Developed Countries," The Journal of Development Economics (April 1977):279.
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percent, petroleum products and other fuels by 2.4 percent, and manufac¬
tures by about 1.9 percent. Consequently, when incomes rise in rich
countries, the demand for food, food products, and raw materials from
the third world nations goes up relatively slowly, while the worldwide
demand for manufactures, the production of which is dominated by the
developed countries, goes up very rapidly. Short-run price instability
in export markets can mean wide variability in export revenues, of course,
variation in quantities produced affects earnings as well. As the value
of exports fluctuates widely, leaders and their institutions in a
specialized country lack control over national income, money supply (since
foreign-exchange reserves form part of monetary base), and hence over its
rate of development.
Also, specialization which the neoclassical model prescribes could
turn against the less developed countries due to declining terms of trade
facing exports of agricultural raw materials and minerals. Declining
terms of trade in this sense represents a fall in the ratio of an index
of country's export prices to an index of its import prices. For instance.
Table 1 shows that between 1954 and 1976 the terms of trade for developed
countries remained roughly constant while that of the third world fell
by twenty percent—from 112 to eighty-nine. As a consequence, LDCs had
to sell greater quantities of their primary products (the international
demand for which is relative "income inelastic") in order to purchase a
given quantity of manufactured imports. One estimate has placed the
extra costs of deteriorating terms of trade for the LDCs at over $2.5
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TABLE 1




Territories 1956 •60 •61 ■62 '63 '64 '65 '66 '67 '68 '69 '70 '71 '72 ■73 '74 '75 ■76
Developed
Countries 90 96 97 98 97 97 98 98 99 99 19 100 99 100 99 87 90 89
Major Oil
Exporters 97 113 111 111 109 107 103 101 98 103 103 100 111 106 117 290 286 303
Other Developing
Countries 112 95 91 87 89 91 91 95 92 99 102 100 95 92 97 96 88 89
SOURCE: UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics: Supplement 1977 (New York,
1978), Table 2.5.
♦Unit value index of exports divided by unit value of imports.
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billion per year during the last decade.^ By contrast, oil-exporting
nations realize an extraordinary improvements in their terms of trade
from an average of ninety-seven in 1955 to 303 by 1976 and much higher
in 1980. From 1970 to 1977, Zaire's terms of trade showed a decline
of 5.9 percent. This seems to imply that specialization on primary products
has not benefited the non-oil producing third world countries and Zaire in
particular.
Also the consequence of export-led development may be viewed in terms
of independence or dependence on international markets. Dependence
might broadly be considered to be higher for those countries whose GDPs
contain high proportion of exports and whose exports in turn are highly
concentrated in one product or a few. Table 2 reflects the situation
of some countries.
Thus, this condition has exacerbated Zaire's dependence on the mining
exports, particularly copper, cobalt and diamond vis-a-vis dependence on
external markets.
Dependence on external markets has drastically increased since
dependence with exports now constituting more than sixty percent of the
commercialized gross domestic production. Within this sector, there
is an increasing tendency toward monoproduction. For instance, in 1976
copper and cobalt made up fifty percent of export revenue against
^Michael P. Todaro, Economic Development in the Third World (New
York: Longman, Inc., 1981), p. 341.
^Ibid.
^New African Yearbook, 1980, p. 392.
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TABLE 2








Share of 2 Most
Important Exports
in Total Exports
Share of 3 Most
Important Exports
in Total Exports
Saudi Arabia 82.6% 100.0% — —
Zambia 44.5 94.2 — —
Iran 27.3 91.8 93.3 —
Venezuela 26.6 92.1 96.3 —
Zaire 26.1 66.5 72.7 77.9
Sweden 24.2 22.8 25.7 —
Tanzairia 19.5 20.4 34.1 43.2
Nigeria 16.1 82.5 87.5 90.6
Kenya 15.8 28.0 41.4 —
Peru 12.4 27.1 40.1 49.0
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund, International Statistics, May 1975 date correspond to 1973 except for
Zaire (1970).
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thirty-nine percent in 1959, while agricultural exports declined from
thirty-nine percent in 1959 to twenty percent in 1976.^ Furthermore,
copper, cobalt, diamond, gold, and other minerals comprised most of the
country's exports by value and between sixty to seventy percent of
government revenue. By 1980, mineral production accounted for about
O
eighty-five percent of the government revenue.
The focus on the expansion of the mining industry in Zaire as a
leading export sector was conceived out of the neoclassical theory of
trade. On this ground, the policy planners in Zaire hoped to more than
double mining outputs and foreign exchange earnings as a means of
enhancing a balancedeconomy by using the foreign exchange earnings to
purchase needed machinery, skill and technology for industrialization
and development.
But the situation in Zaire shows that the export-led development
has done no more than create an unbalanced economy in this country.
Unlike Peru, where the expansion of fishmeal exports allowed industriali-
g
zation elsewhere, and Asia after 1950, where revenues from exports
provided the financial resources to launch the development program
in spite of price decreases,in Zaire the expansion of the mining
industry, especially the coppy industry, has not allowed industrialization
^Ibid.
®U. S. Department of the Interior, Mineral Yearbook, 1980, p. 1129.
^Michael Roemer, Fishing for Growth: Export-led Development in
Peru, 1950-67 (CambridgiT Harvard University, 1970).
^^Charles Kindieberger and Bruce Herrick, Economic Development
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1977), p. 279.
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in other sectors and has thus failed to provide substantial financial
resources to launch effective development programs.
Mining development has affected agricultural development in two
major areas. First, transport system during the colonial period was
designed to facilitate the evacuation of agricultural and mineral outputs
to overseas markets. In Shaba region, the railway was built to transport
copper to export outlets and to bring in supplies. Thus, communication
networks were not designed to promote intra-commerce development. This
poor transport system still persisted after independence. Rural farmers
are thus faced with the difficulty of transporting their agricultural
products from the rural areas to the urban centers. This, therefore,
created disincentive among the farmers to increase productivity. As a
result, marketed agricultural production fell by almost forty percent
between 1950 and 1967, and its share of the gross domestic product fell
by 7.87 percent in the same period. Between 1960 and 1970, its share
of GDP was 23.4 percent and fell to twenty-one percent between 1970 and
1977. In 1981, agricultural exports represented 11.4 percent of revenue
and fell by 5.9 percent in 1982.^^
For basic foodstuffs, production was insufficient to meet demand
in a capital of three million people and the large mining centers of
Shaba province. The consumption of wheat flour, which was either imported
or made from imported wheat, rose from 124,240 tons in 1981 to 134,771
tons in 1982 (an increase of 8.5 percent), and 73,362 tons for the first
^^Africa Research Bulletin, Exter, England, October 15-November 14,
1983, p. 7043.
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six months of 1983. Imports of maize fell from 118,712 tons in 1981
to 69,628 tons in 1982 (a decrease of 41.3 percent), following the
decision by Gecamines to limit its overseas purchase to its own
personnel. In July 1983, prices, the import of 140,000 tons of wheat
for 1983, was estimated at a cost of $29 million and the import of
80,000 tons of maize, $25 million, making a total of $54 mill ion.In
1980, over thirty percent of Zaire's foreign exchange was spent on
imported food items. In 1975, imported foodstuffs represented 15.7 percent
of the total imports, while food export represented only twelve percent
of the total exports. In the same period, imports of machinery and
equipment and other manufactured products represented seventy-five percent
of the imports against 6.2 percent of total exports, while export of
fuel and minerals represented seventy-eight percent of the total exports.
This is shown in Table 3. This table demonstrates Zaire's dependence on
the export of mineral outputs, and more essentially the contradictions
in the neoclassical theory of international trade.
The second major area where mining development has affected agricul¬
tural development is in the area of urban migration. The development of
the copper industry in the Shaba region, coupled with the low prices
received by rural farmers for their agricultral produce, made rural
farming less attractive. In response to this the able bodied men and
women whose labor was very instrumental in rural agricultural productivity,
migrated from the villages to the mining areas where wages received





PERCENTAGE SHARE OF THE MAJOR IMPORTS AND EXPORTS IN 1975
Items Imports Exports
Food 15.7% 12.0%
Non-food Agriculture 1.1% 3.2%
Fuel and Mineral 8.2% 78.0%
Machine and Equipment 34.2% 0.2%
Other Manufactured Products 40.8% 6.6%
SOURCE: Encyclopedia of the Third World, Vol. Ill, 1982, p. 1987.
the agricultural sector was badly affected both in terms of its contri¬
bution to gross domestic product and to merchandise total exports. The
following table shows that from 1970 to 1981 percentage of the economically
active population in agriculture has been decreasing at an annual average
rate of two percent.
In 1965, agricultural raw materials represented 4.55 percent of the
total merchandised exports, but by 1979 it had decreased to 2.84 percent,
while minerals (ore and metals) increased from 71.4 percent to 73.07
percent in the same period. The development of mining industries in
Zaire has not only created urban migration, it has also created regional
differences or inequalities in income. Regional per capita GDP (1970)
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TABLE 4






1970 9,720 7,708 79.3
1975 10,752 8,265 76.9
1979 11,685 8,739 74.8
1980 11,925 8,855 74.3
1981 12,181 8,975 73.7
SOURCE: FAQ Production Yearbook 1981, Vol. 35, p. 63.
for example, stands at Z140 in Kinshasa and Shaba, and only Z57 in
Bas-Zaire. This figure varies from Z39 in Kasai Oriental to over Z22
13
in Kivu. The income gap between town and country is even more
disturbing; the average income in Lumbumbashi is Z348 whereas for a
14
peasant in Kivu, it is only Z6.
Mining Impact on Manufacturing
One of the expected benefits of the mining industry in Zaire was
that it would lead to the establishment of secondary industries which
13^ire, A Country Study, Foreign Area Studies, ed., Irving-Kaplan
(Washington, 0. C.: The Amercian University, 1979), p. 215.
^^Africa South of the Sahara, 12 ed. (London: Europa Publications
Limi ted, 1982-83), p. 1152.
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would absorb the raw materials from the mining industry for transformation
into semi or finish goods. This expectation was based on the premise
that mineral exports would generate enough foreign exchange for domestic
development. Also, the proximity to raw materials would reduce transport
cost, labor cost, price, and increase the demand for the locally manufac¬
tured products. Consequently, an increase in demand for these products
would increase production, employment, and total revenue. But the
examination of the situation in Zaire will show that these expectations
have not been met. First, from 1974 to 1975 the mining industry failed
to generate adequate foreign exchange due to the worldwide fall in copper
prices (from $3,000 to $1,000 per ton). As a result, the manufacturing
sector, which had been growing at about twice the rate of the total
Zairian economy, fell by 26.2 percent between 1974 and 1978. In the same
period its share of the gross domestic product dropped from 1974 peak of
8.6 percent to a 1978 low of 4.2 percent. The share of manufacturers on
export also explains the rate of its development. In 1965, manufactured
goods represented 8.31 percent of the total merchandised exports, but by
1979 it accounted for only 3.4 percent of exports. Also, the development
of manufacturing sector requires both physical and human capital (invest¬
ment) for it to operate very effectively. In the absence of a more
recent data, the one in the late 1960s shows that the value added in
manufacturing sector declined from 1966 to 1968. This is shown in
Table 5.
^^Agency for International Development's Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance, Zaire: A Country Profile, Washington, D. C., 1981, p. 32.
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TABLE 5
ZAIRE VALUE ADDED BY SECONDARY SECTOR, 1966-68 AT 1966
PRICES (IN MILLIONS OF ZAIRES)
1966 1967 1968
Mineral Processing 32.71 32.96 34.00
Copper 27.84 28.54 29.33
Cobalt 2.93 2.59 2.70
Zinc 1.67 1.67 1.72
Tin and Cadmium 0.27 0.16 0.25
Manufacturing 18.41 17.96 16.75
Consumption Goods 11.23 10.85 10.29
Foodstuffs 1.75 1.86 1.94
Beverages 3.10 3.06 3.01
Tobacco 0.93 0.89 0.87
Clothing 1.14 1.07 0.88
Shoes and Leather 1.35 1.24 1.08
Chemicals 0.92 0.86 0.90
Plastics 0.28 0.38 0.42
Metals 0.46 0.42 0.31
Others 1.30 1.07 0.88
SOURCE: Survey of African Economies, Vol. 4, 1971
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The above data also shows that while the value added in the manu¬
facturing industries has been declining steadily over the three-year
period, it has been increasing in the mineral processing sector, thereby
showing the pattern of investment in the mineral industries.
More importantly, one of.the expected benefits of mining expansion,
that is, the creation of local industries to transform mining outputs
into intermediate goods, have not occurred in Zaire. For instance, of
the total mineral production of 439,643 tons in 1979, 95.6 percent
(420,458 tons) was exported overseas, especially to Belgium-Luxembourg,
the U. S. A., West Germany, Sweden, and Japan.This means that only
4.4 percent of mining output was used by the local industries. According
to Professor Samir Amin:
The key to the Euro-American concept of a growing economy is
its emphasis on exports. The export model, in effect, pre¬
scribes that the people of the developing countries shall not
work for themselves, but for others. Development, true
development, is not directed at exports but at the domestic
requirement of the national economy, particularly for the
great mass of the people, and the satisfaction of their
most urgent needs. The export sector helps to shape the
entire economy, supporting a system of unequal exchange under
which the prime task of the economy is to provide cheap
labour for export purposes.17
In this respect, the influence of foreign interests in Zaire's mining
export makes the development of the domestic economy very difficult.
The resultant effect is dependent on external markets. In 1975, imports
of machinery and equipment and other manufactured products represented
seventy-five percent of the imports against 6.2 percent of total exports.
^^Mineral Yearbook, 1980, p. 1129.
^^Samir Amin, "Growth Is Not Development," Development Forum, published
by the United Nations Centre for Economic and Social Information, Vol. 1,
No. 3, April 1973.
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Mininq Impact on Employment
In terms of mining employment, there is no comprehensive statistics
on this. The available statistics show that the real impact of mining
in generating employment has been declining in percentage terms relative
to other sectors, although in numerical terms it has been increasing.
In 1966, mining accounted for 10.9 percent of wage earners employed by
1 ft
enterprise, and by 1968 this declined to 9.4 percent. However, by
1980, this sector employed about thirteen percent of the economically
active population. It employed about eleven percent of the population
between 1981 and 1984. This figure is not encouraging at least in the
context of the neoclassical model.
Lastly, the expectation by the policy planners that the expansion
of the mining industry would boost foreign exchange earnings is one of
disappointment. Due to price changes of the major mineral exports
(copper and cobalt) in 1974 Zaire's foreign exchange earnings fell from
a 1973 high of Z65.20 million to a 1976 low of Z15.16. By 1979, there
was an increase of 19.94 percent from the 1976 figure when the production
and price of copper were marginally restored. The fall in her foreign
exchange earnings greatly affected its external debt problems, estimated
at about $5 billion in 1982. This resulted in a deteriortation of
Zaire's real annual growth rate beginning from 1974. This is shown in
Table 6.
1 ft
International Monetary Fund, Surveys of African Economics,
Washington, D. C., Vol. 4, 1971, p. 57.
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TABLE 6
ZAIRE: REAL ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (1974-1978)
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
5.4% 0.6% -.3% -1.9% -1.0%
SOURCE: Overseas Business Reports, December 1979, OBR 79-44
The above statistics shows that Zaire's experience, under export-led
development, has been very disappointing. In other words, neoclassical
theory of international trade (factor endowment) does not favor Zaire's
economic development.
Problems Confronting the Mining Industry in Zaire
The reasons why the mining industry in Zaire has failed to play a
leading role of the export sector go beyond the influence of foreign
interests. Government policies and corruption in the high echelon have
contributed immensely to the poor performance of the mining sector.
There have been many charges of malpractices by President Mobutu
and his staff in the marketing of Zaire's mineral products. According
to the official report read before the Subcommittee of Africa of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, U. S. House of Representatives on September
15, 1981, Nguza Karl-1-Bond made the following testimony:
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Before I left Zaire in April 1981, I was officially informed
by a report of the Bank of Zaire that Mr. Mobutu directed
that approximately $30 million in Belgian francs be trans¬
ferred to his personal account. I was also officially
informed that Mr. Mobutu arranged for Gecamines and Sozacom
to export and sell privately 20,000 tons of copper for his
benefit. In addition, an unknown quantity of cobalt and
diamonds was exported by chartered aircraft to European
countries with the proceeds of these sales deposited directly
into Mr. Mobutu's personal accounts abroad.
The government was willing to admit at the end of 1982 that its own
officials had embezzled more than $720 million, a sum equivalent to one-
half of its annual expenditures.
Policies that were designed to promote mining production were very
expensive to implement and sometime ill defined. For instance, the
estimated 1973 cost of Inga-Shaba line (designed to increase copper
production) was $250 million but it finally escalated to more than
$680 million, not including the annual management and maintenance costs,
which some estimates put at $30 million. Constructing of the Inga-
Shaba line was also used to justify the development of Inga-2 at a cost
of over $500 million. Both projects were financed largely at market
rates, and together account for 24.3 percent of Zaire's external debt
commitments as of 1980 (12.7 percent of Inga-Shaba and 11.6 percent for
Inga-2).
In 1975, a monopoly right was accorded to the state's marketing agency
for mineral products, Sozacom (Societe Zairoise de Commercialization
des Mineraie). By a presidential decree of January 27, 1982, Sozacom
had been brought, along with Gecamines, under the authority of a control
^^Nguza Karl-l-Bond, "The Situation in Zaire," Africa Report,
November/December 1981, pp. 19-21.
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group attached directly to the presidency and consisting of the State
Commissioners for Finance and for Transportation, the Governor of the
Bank of Zaire and the head of the presidency staff. Gecamines was also
authorized to handle directly the delivery of its own products while
marketing decisions remained the responsibility of Sozacom. The
implications of this policy are as follows: the direct control of
the marketing and delivery of the mineral products by the President and
his staff served as a basis for the embezzlements reported by Nguza.
Secondly, under this policy Gecamines was obligated to pay fifty-five
percent of its revenue to the government purse, which meant that only
forty-five percent of its export revenue was left for reinvestment and
modernization of the company. The implications of this policy forced
Zaire's creditors, and most importantly the World Bank, to demand
Gecamines' freedom to handle its own marketing so that it can be assured




This study has shown that Zaire is richly endowed with vast mineral
resources that are readily transformed into a large financial flow.
In spite of this richness, Zaire is unable to effectively industrialize
its economy and more essentially, improve the standard of living of its
people. The reasons for this are both domestic and external. Domestically,
there are charges of malpractice by the President and his staff. Also,
policies designed to boost mining production were very expensive and in
some cases were not aimed at generating employment but at generating
foreign exchange earnings.
Externally, factors range from fluctuations of minerals prices in
the world market to the economic exploitation enjoyed by the advanced
capitalist countries.
This study has also shown that due to high demand inelasticity and
price changes in copper and cobalt, Zaire was unable to launch a bouyant
economic development starting from 1974. As a result, there was a lack
of sufficient foreign exchange to import spare parts and other capital
goods needed for effective industrialization. Thus, both manufacturing
and agricultural development was hampered.
Third, the development of the mining industry has been responsible
for both regional and per capita differences of which rural drain of
manpower has been the major consequence; hence, the deterioration of
agricultural production, the increased imports of agricultural foodstuffs,
and the decrease in agricultural exports.
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Fourth, the development of the export sector (mineral export)
during the colonial era has been responsible for the poor communication
system in Zaire. The roads were built to transport raw materials to
the overseas markets and to bring in manufactured products into the
colony. As such, they were not designed to promote internal commerce
and thus much dependence was placed on exports.
Fifth, there is valid evidence in this paper that the mining
industry in Zaire has not promoted local employment at least in percentage
terms, although it has in numerical terms. Furthermore, the creation of
the manufacturing industries that could utilize the outputs from the
mines seemed not to have occurred because about ninety-six percent of
all mineral outputs are destined to foreign advanced countries. The
valued added in the manufacturing industry showed an average annual
decline of three percent over a three-year period (1966 to 1968).
Sixth, an investigation into Zaire's export structure showed that
it is not diversified and is essentially composed of few mineral products
(copper, cobalt, and diamond). Mining products account for over sixty
percent of Zaire's commercialized GDP. The problem of export concentration
was noted in this paper.
The most important findings of this study is that the fact that
some third world nations like Peru, Korea, Ceylon, and Zambia experienced
significant economic development through export did not apply in the case
of Zaire. It is the conclusion of this paper that development, based on
export, has not favored Zaire.
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An attempt has been made to answer some of the questions raised
earlier at the beginning of this paper, that is, what is the impact of •
the mining industry on Zaire's economic development. It has also
analyzed the problems of export-led development along lines indicated
by the neoclassical model of international trade. This study seems to
confirm the finding by Ochola, Mikesell, and Khadim, that is, the mining
industry has failed to play the role of a leading sector. In other
words, the mining industry, contrary to the general expectation of the
policy planners, failed to generate adequate foreign exchange earnings
needed to stimulate Zaire's economic development. The fact that Zaire's
experience under export-led development has been unfavorable, comes as
no surprise if one examines the relationship between the center and the
periphery presented by the "dependencia." Most of the mining activities
in Zaire are dominated by the advanced capitalist countries, although
efforts have been made to regain the sovereign rights over the mineral
resources. Recent events like the token take-over of some oil companies
may be considered desirable, but the whole ownership acquisition process
should be carried on a continental basis, that is, all African countries
and the third world nations in general should be part of this process.
However, nationalization by itself is not enough, it should be accompanied
by taking control of management, processing, and marketing. Caution
must, however, be exercised in the use of nationalization policy due
to its possible negative impact on future investment. Nationalization
in most cases, is not politically and economically feasible, especially
if the country adopting it lacks managerial and technical manpower to
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replace the expatriates once they are gone. Zaire's experience under
its 1974 nationalization poicy, showed how dangerous it is to use this
policy without an experienced domestic management team.
The fact that most of the mineral resources in Zaire are destined
to foreign markets does not only signify lack of technical know-how and
manpower in the field of mineral operations, but also reflects the
capitalist inherent nature for expansion and exploitation of the developing
countries. The dominance of the world economy by the advanced capitalist
countries (U. S. A., France, Japan, and Britain) in the areas of trade,
commerce, investment and technology has not only weakened the power of
the developing countries in setting prices for their primary products
in world markets, but has also subjected them as victims of price
fluctuations endemic in these economies. Zaire's experience underscores
the above argument, hence, its inability to generate foreign earnings
necessary to embark on a grand economic development. Compounded to this
problem is the international specialization which relegates to the
developing nations the labor intensive product specialization and to
the developed nations the capital intensive product specialization.
This type of division has two consequences: 1) The developing nations
are finding it very difficult to penetrate into the markets of the
advanced countries with capital intensive goods such as cars, amunition,
and electronics because the capital needed to manufacture these products
are very expensive in the developing economies and therefore cannot
compete with those produced in the advanced countries where capital is
very cheap. 2) This division has created, according to Samir Amin,
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unequal trade (exchanges) between the developing and the developed
countries. The cheap raw materials exported from the developing
economies to the developed economies are transformed into manufactured
products in the center and exported to the periphery at very high prices,
thereby draining the economies of the less developed countries. It is
necessary to point out that labor is very expensive in the DCS and this
•
high cost of labor is paid by the masses of the developing nations.
This clearly demonstrates the implication of the international speciali¬
zation. On the other spectrum is the ability of the DCS to do most of
their exchanges among themselves. The U. S. A. can export amunition
to Japan and in turn import cars and electronics from Japan with both
sides being satisfied. However, in rare cases can a country like Zaire
feel satisfied with its trading arrangement with Belgium. This does not
mean that developing nations do not gain from their trading arrangements
with the DCS but the point is^the gains they make are far below the
gains made had the exchange been done between one developed country and
the other. However, the presentation of the impact of the mining
industry on Zaire's economic development and the identification of the
problems confronting the mining industry by themselves are not sufficient.
They should include some measures necessary in alleviating or possibly
eliminating those problems.
Finally, if by miracle the problems are solved or the world economy
becomes characterized by equal exchange, there will be no guarantee that
a country like Zaire will experience remarkable economic development
without a change in its leadership. Zaire needs a leadership that
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understands that the problem of its people are its own problems. It
needs an administration whose economic and social policies are designed
to benefit all segments of the population. Zaire needs a leadership
who does not make public funds its own funds or who allows its staff
to indulge in indiscriminate embezzlements without being brought to
justice. In essence, the problem confronting the mining industry and
the economic development of Zaire does not only emanate from foreign
interests, export-led development failure, or the neoclassical theory
of international trade, but from the machinations and corruption of
the Mobutu's government.
Recommendations
The presence of the capitalist advanced countries has been cited
earlier in this paper as one of the major problems confronting the mining
industry in Zaire. In order to ameliorate their impact, the writer makes
the following policy recommendations.
1) The Zairian government should include a provision in its mining
legislation which will mandate the foreign companies located in
Zaire to provide substantial training to its citizens. The time
period for providing such training should also be specified in
the legislation. The adoption of this policy and its compliance
by the foreign companies will help trained Zairians to adequately
operate the mining industry themselves once their foreign
trainers are gone.
2) Zaire's government should negotiate management contracts with
foreign firms for the purpose of establishing the mining
operations. The foreign firms should be encouraged to help
finance it by granting a fixed interest bearing loan for the
duration of the management contract. This policy will avoid
permanent foreign ownership and control, and will provide
technical assistance and expertise as well as the capital.
3) In view of the structural problems (e.g., infrastructure) which
have contributed to the deterioration of the agricultural sector.
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the writer recommends that the following policy measures be
adopted in order to increase agricultural productivity and
thus reduce Zaire's dependence on the external markets for its
basic foodstuffs such as cassava, maize, wheat and rice.
A) The Zairian government should embark on a five-year develop¬
ment plan which will give top priority to the improvement
of the roads and bridges that connect the rural areas where
most of the farm work is done to the urban centers. This,
of course, calls for the allocation of the greatest percentage
of its annual budget to the transport sector.
B) Commercial banks should be encouraged to grant low interest
bearing loans only to farm cooperatives. This measure will
encourage farmers to form cooperatives. The interests on
these loans should be paid by the government as a part of
its contribution to the development of the agricultural
sector. This method of loan extension to cooperatives has
advantage over the loan to individual farmers because it
reduces the cases whereby farmers tend to use the loans
received in solving their own personal problems, or in
buying expensive luxury items like cars, houses, and
electronic equipments. An agency attached to the ministry
of agriculture should be created to supervise and monitor
the progress of the farm cooperatives purposely to ensure
that the loans are used properly to increase agricultural
production. Banks making these loans should be given a
certain percentage of tax credit for about five years. This
measure will encourage the conmercial banks to make further
loans.
C) Scholarships should be granted through the ministry of
education to any Zairian who wishes to study agricultural
science in the institutions of higher learning. Those
trained upon graduation will be able to teach the uneducated
farmers the modern method of agricultural production.
The success of these policy measures will boost domestic
production of foodstuffs and invariably reduce the importation
of foodstuffs. Such a reduction of food imports means the
availability of a new source of foreign exchange necessary for
economic development.
4) Manufacturing industries should be developed by discouraging
the Zairian people from mass consumption of imported manufactures
through import quotas and high import duties. This measure will
increase the demand for locally manufactured goods. Some products
like medicine should have less restrictions since the country does
not have the capability of meeting the medical needs of its people
independently.
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The success of the above policy recommendations depends, however,
on an effective government, that is, an administration that is uncorrupt,
unrepressive to oppositions, and which seeks to incorporate the welfare
of its people in formulating its economic, social and political policies.
The success of these recommendations in Zaire is very bleak under
Mr. Mobutu's government unless his administration is replaced by a more
democratic and effective one.
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